Commentary: How the Ukraine invasion provoked a change of heart in Germany about defence
The two halves of Germany were separated by an internal border, most powerfully symbolised by the Berlin Wall.
In this period, dialogue with Russia seemed to pay dividends: In the 1970s, under Chancellor Willy Brandt, relations thawed and more contact was permitted between the two Germanies. Extensive negotiation with the USSR enabled an agreement on German reunification to be reached in 1990.
Ukraine itself is a case in point in illustrating the way that Germany has approached foreign policy, given its history. Back in 2014, Germany helped get the (now obsolete) Minsk agreements between Russia and Ukraine over the line, and since then has paid substantial sums in development and other assistance.
While being somewhat ready to challenge Russian aggression, it saw itself as a mediator in a division of labour, leaving sharper military tasks to other countries, and trying always to keep lines of dialogue with Russia open.
DOMESTIC SUPPORT
While the changed policy on military spending represents a dramatic shift, Germany’s mainstream political parties are broadly united on the matter.
Scholz’s SPD has, in fact, been the most cautious of the German government’s three coalition partners when it comes to Russia but the party is supportive of the Chancellor’s decision.
Liberal and Green coalition partners had, in any case, been pushing for a firmer line on Russia, but it is striking that fiscally-hawkish liberal Finance Minister Christian Lindner has backed the increased defence spending being paid out of new debt– and that the Greens have not demurred at arms exports.
The Christian Democratic opposition has quibbled at the financing of defence spending, while endorsing the principles.
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