It is far more likely that Russia will also insist on formal Western recognition of Ukrainian neutrality, as well as some sort of international mechanism (with Russian participation) to “interpret” what is permissible for Ukraine under the terms of its neutrality.
Nor is it clear what would be in such an agreement for Ukraine. From a Ukrainian perspective, the fate of the 1994 Budapest Memorandum, in which Russia, the UK and the US “reaffirmed their commitment to Ukraine … to respect the independence and sovereignty and the existing borders of Ukraine” and “to refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of Ukraine”.
These security guarantees were offered in exchange for Ukraine’s abandonment of its Soviet-inherited arsenal of nuclear weapons.
RETURN TO DIPLOMACY?
There is also the question of which version of Ukraine Russia would recognise as a sovereign state if Ukraine were to agree to become “neutral”. Would this include the illegally occupied and now recognised areas of Donetsk and Luhansk and the annexed Crimean Peninsula?
The Kremlin’s vision of a Belarus-like vassal state with highly conditional and very limited sovereignty dictated by Putin is one which Ukraine has clearly, consistently and democratically rejected over the past 30 years. Neutrality on these terms seem unlikely to be the basis of how this conflict ends.
For the West more generally, it is also important that Putin is not rewarded, or seen to be rewarded, for his illegal war. The idea that Ukraine should be demilitarised and “de-Nazified” as a price for ending the conflict would be seen internationally as capitulation.
Instead, the West needs to continue to show resolve in proactively containing Russia. Anything else would have resonance, and negative ramifications, far beyond Europe.
Muddying the diplomatic waters further with an unpalatable, and in all likelihood, unattainable, “solution” wastes precious time and resources that now would be better devoted to achieving a stable ceasefire and an end to Russia’s aggression.
Only then will a much-needed discussion on a more viable European security order have any prospects of success.
Stefan Wolff and David Hastings Dunn are a Professor of International Security and a Professor of International Politics in the Department of Political Science and International Studies at the University of Birmingham respectively. This commentary first appeared in The Conversation.
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